My proximity to the person and my knowledge of the poison in her drink facilitate my being able to fulfill my natural duty of mutual aid, but it is not a part of the fundamental explanation of why I have such a duty in the first place. Is this too demanding? Another move that the consequentialist can make is to claim that each person taking care of her own intimates or keeping her own promises is an intrinsically valuable state of affairs.
Are these obligations mere obligations of role without moral implications, or are they genuinely moral special obligations?
As both he and the advocates of such accounts point out, my strongest psychological connections are those that I bear to myself.
This fact about the human beings who make promises, stand in familial relationships, and have friends, leads to the worry that special obligations, in certain circumstances, will license, and perhaps even require, very bad behavior.
One response is that in fact they do have prima facie special obligations of role to one another, but that, given the hideous nature of the aims of Aryan Nation, those obligations are never their all-things-considered duties, i.
Of course, this account requires far more development. In attempting to ground special obligations, the defender of special obligations must face issues about the role of the metaphysics of personal identity in determining features of morality and questions in moral epistemology, among other issues.
Physicians and therapists have obligations to their patients, police officers to the citizens of their jurisdictions, ministers and priests to their flocks, etc. The obvious worry about any such Aristotelian account is its distance from commonsense. It seems that I have special obligations to help my intimates be virtuous, even if they are not yet virtuous.
How can we justify partiality to our perhaps already comparatively well-off compatriots when many people around the globe do not have the basic necessities? Thomas Nagel explicates the difference between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons in a slightly different way: The Aristotelian must either deny that we have special obligations to our non-virtuous intimates or allow that something other than virtuous character grounds special obligations to most of our intimates.
If I can produce more value by promoting your taking care of your intimates than by taking care of my own, then I ought to do the former rather than the latter. Let us begin with option i. The difficulty with this option is that it does little to accommodate the range of special obligations acknowledged by commonsense morality.
But the question then remains: Yet others Moellendorf try to extend the notion of association in such a way that the global economy, for example, grounds associational duties see Lenard and Moore for discussion of such views.
Thus, acting as though and believing that we have special obligations at least to friends and family members is advantageous.Who we are; What we do; Corporate reporting; Careers; Contact Us; Commission in Scotland Your responsibility for others; Your responsibility for others.
Advice and Guidance. What is on this page? Your responsibilities. Who is this page for? Any organisation providing a service you will have to do more than this to actively. Mar 23, · Do we have a duty to help others? Posted on March 23, by philosophyfactory As usual, one of Andy’s posts has me thinking this time it’s the one on Anthony Bourdain.
More cosmopolitan and universalistic, Kant holds that there are universal duties that we have, both to ourselves and to others, simply as human beings, and he regards these as in some sense the foundations of all our duties, within which we also acquire duties in consequence of social customs, institutions and relationships.
Many of us have wondered at one point or another how much we should be doing to help those in need, and whether or not there's some kind of "moral obligation" to do so.
It can be anything from an occasional $50 donation after a natural disaster, or getting formally trained to work professionally in a field that directly helps others.
Special obligations are obligations owed to some subset of persons, in contrast to natural duties that are owed to all persons simply qua persons. Common sense morality seems to understand us as having special obligations to those to whom we stand in some sort of special relationship, e.g., our friends, our family members, our colleagues, our fellow.
What are your responsibilities to yourself, your family, your friends and to the society and the nation at large? As what I do I set an example for others too, and a lead is formed out of it. If we go outstations, parents think that we are leaving them. But that's not true. We have to go there for work and for the betterment of their.Download